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PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE
DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONDITIONAL
SALES AND CHATTEL MORTGAGES

I By

RAYMOND YOUNG

In the present era of vast and tremondous business enterprise, when property is being transferred with a rapidity which
would have caused a numbing confusion among merchants of
past years, when credit is extended and indebtness secured
largely by property, when judgments are rife and execution
levied upon property to an extent quite unprecedented, it behooves one who sells property to know wherein protection of
his interests in property sold may best be had.
In general, limiting our field to the sale of personalty, there
are two .kinds of security: the conditional sale and the chattel
mortgage. Though different in their nature, these two forms
are often difficult to distinguish one from the other. The digests
and reporters fairly bristle with cases decided by the courts where
the sole question presented was whether the instrument before
them was a mortgage or a conditional sales contract. It is
from the cases that certain general principles have been evolved
which have subsequently aided the other courts when presented
with the delicate question of construing these instruments and
determining in which class the instrument rightly belongs.
To a complete understanding of this somewhat involved distinction, it is not only advantageous but extremely necessary that
we leave behind us a Daedalian cord so that as we proceed into
the labyrinth we may retrace our mental advance and determine
its course. Nothing could serve better as such a "cord" than a
simple workable definition of the two forms of security.
A conditional sale is, as its name implies, one in which
the buyer is to perform some condition, precedent or concurrent, before the title becomes complete in him, the title meanwhile remaining in the seller. For the purpose of this treatise,
the condition of the sale will be limited to that of payment of
purchase prise the definition then being a sale whereby the seller
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delivers possesion to the buyer but reserves to himself a title to
the goods, until the whole amount due therefor is paid.'
A chattel mortgage in some states retains its common law
character and is looked upon as a sale of the subject matter, on
condition subsequent, passing a legal title subject to be defeated
by the condition upon which it is given. 2 But by the weight of
authority a mortgage on chattels is regarded as constituting security, and creating a lien upon the subject matter.
From the above definitions it is apparent that a distinction must be made, for the nature of the seller's right must be
ascertained before his remedy can be determined. The remedy
in the case of a chattel mortgage is limited to foreclosure and
sale, and in case they are insufficient to pay the amount due, a deficency judgment. In the case of a conditional sale, the remedy
of the seller is not only an enforcement of the contract, but he
may sue in replevin to recover back the property.
All courts agree on the general proposition that at some
point the seller in a conditional sales agreement is bound to
make an election, either to admit title to be in the purchaser by
suing for the balance due, or to bring the action in replevin
thereby voiding the contract. The confusion results when the
various courts attempt to determine at jusf what point the election has been made: the commencement of the action, the recovery of the judgment, or the execution of the judgment.
That, however, is a question not embraced within the purpose of this paper, and so, interesfing as it is, a discussion of it
must belaid aside in favor of this article.
At first blush it would seem that the distinction between
the chattel mortgage and the conditional sale is clear cut and
well defined, but unfortunately it is not so. It is natural that the
seller in his zeal to protect his interests will attempt in the contract of sale to insert every conceivable provision designed, ostensibly at least, to insure his protection. As a result we havea hybrid instrument, partaking of the nature of a conditional sale
and a mortgage. In such cases, and they are many, it becomes
necessary for the court, before which the instrument comes, as
a prelude to the ascertainment of the rights of the parties claimi Tiffany on Sales.
2 II C. J. 398. Chattel Mortgages.
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ing under it, to exactly determine the nature of the instrument.
As stated by the writer of an exhaustive note on the subject of
conditional sales in American Lawyers' Report, "It is sometimes
a close question to determine whether the contract is one of absolute sale without reservation of title by way of a chattel mortgage, or a conditional sale with absolute reservation of title in
the seller, with payment of the purchase price as a condition
precedent to the passing title."
In the construction of such instruments the courts have
evolved certain general rules of construction to be applied when
future cases arise, in order that the task of differentiation may
be facilitated.
As we would expect to find it, the principle primarily adopted by the courts in such cases is that usually applied in contracts:
the ascertainment of the intention of the parties as to what
they agreed is to be drawn from the terms of the instrument and
also from the attendant circumstances. Even though the parties
set out in the contract that the instrument is a conditional sale,
the court is not 'bound by its provisions, as it considers them in
connection with the attendant circumstances. "Form counts for
very little," as said by one court. On the other hand even
though the parties may treat the instrument as a mortgage and
record it as required by the statute governing chattel mortgages, the court may entirely disregard their actions and declare the instrument to be a conditional sale.
This general principle of determination of the intention of
the parties is of course not peculiar to the law of sales or mortgages It is a creature of the law of contracts and ramifies into
all subdivisions of that subject.
There are however a few principles which grew out of this
attempt by the courts to distiguish between these two classes
of contracts:
1. If the transfer is intended to secure an existing indebttedness it is a mortgage; but if it is given upon an agreement to
sell and delivery of property, the title being retained by the seller,
subject to a condition subsequent, the transaction is a conditional
sale.4
s P iebert v Nat]. Cash Register Co. 52 N. E. 22.
4Plumber v Shirley 16.380. Also Lumber v Woodward 144 Ind. 335 where
a reservation by a seller of a vendor's lien in an instrument of sale was
held to create a chattel mortgage.
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This rule appears to be questionable in view of the fact that
the transfer in the case of a mortgage might also be coificident
with the sale, in a case for example, where there is an absolute
sale with a mortgage back. The test however has been applied
in a great many jurisdictions. 5
2. The test or principle most frequently adopted is that
where the instrument is ambiguous or doubtful, the presumption
is in favor of the mortgage and against the conditional sale. The
reason for this presumption was stated very lucidly and clearly
by the New York Court of Appeals, to be that "in case of a mortgage the mortgagor although he has complied strictly with the
terms of the mortgage, still has his right of redemption, while in
the case of a conditional sale, without strict compliance the
rights of the conditional purchaser are forfeited.6 This test has
7
frequently been applied.
These two princ.iples, together with the general principle
of ascertainment of intention, seem to be the only rules which
have anything of a unanimity in their application by the courts.
Other rules have been evolved by judicial decisions which have
been applied by the courts. One such rule has been applied by the
court of Colorado. The. rule is easy of application and appears
to the writer to be one which might well be universally adopted.
It is that "optional payment is essential to .constitute the transaction a conditional sale; a contract that imposes an unconditional liability upon the vendee to pay the purchase price is an
absolute and not a conditional sale." s Where for example, the
vendee has given notes for a balance due which import an absolute promise to pay the amount due, the courts which have
adopted this rule would regard the contract as an absolute sale
with mortgage back rather than a conditional sale, the reservation of title being merely a security for the payment of the debt. 9
However, if the notes are in the form o chattel notes, that is,
the notes on their face contain a statement of the transaction,
it would seem that this would make the contract conditional.
This question is an interesting one and the affirmative and the
Ind. and others.
e Matthews v Sheehan 69 N. Y. 585.
7 43 So. 409 (Alab.), 19 Ia. 335, 55N. W. 711 (Wis.), 52 N. E. 22 (I1.),
24 N. W. 369 (Minn.), 98 N: E: 322 (Ind:) 54 Miss: 90:
a Andrews v Bank 20 Col. 313.
9 Tufts v Beach 44 Pac. 771.
5 Ill., N. Y., U. S.,
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negative of .the proposition are upheld by two distinct lines
of cases.' 0
These in general are the principles and rules, the results
of numerous decisions of the courts which are applied in determining whether an instrument is a conditional sale or chattel mortgage.
In some jurisdictions the distinctions bttween these two
devices have been abolished and any attempt to reserve title in
the seller is construed to be a chattel mortgage.
In Texas the distinction has been abolished by a statute
which declares that a contract of sale with reservation of title
is a chattel mortgage."
In Kentucky a similar result was arrived at by judicial decision. The rule has prevailed there since 1886 that where there
is a clause in a contract reserving title in the seller until payment,
title passes to the buyer, the effect being an absolute sale with
a mortgage back:12 and this rule has prevailed in that state
whenever the question. arose in the courts.
A number of states have adopted what is known as the
Uniform Conditional Sales Act, the purpose of which is to make
uniform the laws governing the subject of conditional sales. In
these states the distinction remains inviolate, and the rules and
canons of costruction must be applied as before.' 3
In other states rules, statutory and judicial, have been
fixed governing {he subject, most of the states providing for
a filing for record of such contracts. A few states, notably
Indiana, do not require recording of conditional sales although
recording of chattel mortgages is required.
A rather unique provision is made in the statute of Maine
which provides for the forclosure of a conditional sale giving to
the'purchaser the right of redemption after sale.
The nature of the subject here treated does not admit of
dbgmatic rules applicable in all cases. Every contract must,
to a greater or less degree, be governed by its terms and the
surrounding circumstances attending the- transaction. To atio That the contract is conditional 139 N. W. 101. that the contract Is
merely for security 175 Pac. 746.
ii Decisions under statute: 173 S. W-. 184, 199 S. W. 843.
12 I. S. W. 414.
is This act has been adopted In Alaska, Arizona, Deleware, New Jersey,
New York, and Wisconsin.
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tempt to apply without qualification some general rule of law
would be a violation of the intention of the parties and make for
them a new contract. It has been for this reason the writer's
aim to do no more than state the rules which the courts have recognized and applied in their attempts to administer justice to the
parties before them.

